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Abstract. Cloud computing is an emerging technology that allows to access computing re-
sources on a pay-per-use basis. The main challenges in this area are the efficient performance
management and the energy costs minimization. In this paper we model the service provision-
ing problem of Cloud Platform-as-a-Service systems as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
and show that a potential function for the game exists. Moreover, we prove that the social opti-
mum problem is convex and we derive some properties of social optima from the corresponding
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker system. Next, we propose a distributed solution algorithm based on the
best response dynamics and we prove its convergence to generalized Nash equilibria. Finally, we
numerically evaluate equilibria in terms of their efficiency with respect to the social optimum of
the Cloud by varying our algorithm initial solution. Numerical results show that our algorithm
is scalable and very efficient and thus can be adopted for the run-time management of very large
scale systems.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm that aims at streamlining the on-demand provision-
ing of flexible and scalable services accessible through the Internet [24]. The main idea is to
supply users with on-demand access to computing or storage resources and charge fees for their
usage. In these models, users pay only for the resources they use and they can access software
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applications (Software as a Service – SaaS), tools for the development and deployment of Cloud-
based applications (Platform as a Service – PaaS) or even low level hardware physical resources
(Infrastructure as a Service – IaaS).
In the SaaS paradigm, applications are available over the Web. The SaaS provider hosts both
the application and the data, hence the end-user is able to use and access the service from all
over the world. With PaaS, applications are developed and deployed on platforms transparently
managed by the Cloud provider. The platform typically includes databases, middleware, and also
development tools. In IaaS systems, virtual computer environments are provided as services and
servers, storage, and network equipment can be outsourced by customers without the expertise
to operate them.
Many companies (e.g., Google, Amazon, and Microsoft) are offering Cloud computing ser-
vices such as Google’s App Engine and Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) or Microsoft
Windows Azure. Large data centers provide the infrastructure behind the Cloud, and virtual-
ization technology (which allows the execution of multiple virtual machines on the same physical
machine) makes Cloud computing resources more efficient and cost-effective both for providers
and customers. Indeed, end-users obtain the benefits of the infrastructure without the need to
implement and administer it directly adding or removing capacity almost instantaneously on
a “pay-as-you-use” basis. On the other hand, Cloud providers can maximize the utilization of
their physical resources also obtaining economies of scale.
The development of efficient service provisioning policies is among the major issues in Cloud
research. Indeed, modern Clouds operate in a new and dynamic world, characterized by contin-
uous changes in the environment and in the system and performance requirements that must be
satisfied. Continuous changes occur without warning and in an unpredictable manner, and are
outside the control of the Cloud provider. Therefore, advanced solutions need to be developed
that manage the Cloud system in a dynamically adaptive fashion, while continuously provid-
ing service and performance guarantees. Recent studies [14, 17, 24] have shown that the main
challenges for Cloud systems are the reduction of costs and the improvements of performance
levels.
Information Technology (IT) analysts state that at the end of 2012, up to 40% of the budgets
of Cloud service centers are devoted to energy costs [18, 28]. Service centers investment grew by
22.1% during 2012 and it is expected it will further grow by another 14.5% in 2013 [25]. Energy
efficiency is therefore one of the main focal points on which resource management should be
concerned. In addition, providers need to comply with Service Level Agreement (SLA) contracts
that determine the revenues gained and penalties incurred on the basis of the level of performance
achieved. Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees have to be satisfied despite workload fluctuations,
which could span several orders of magnitude within the same business day [17, 18].
The recent development of Cloud systems and the rapid growth of the Internet have led to a
remarkable usage of game-theoretic tools. Problems arising in the IT industry, such as quality
of service or resource allocation, pricing, and load shedding, can not be handled with classical
optimization approaches because each player can be affected by the actions of all players, not only
by his own actions. In this setting, a natural modeling framework involves seeking an equilibrium
or stable operating point for the system, provided that it exists. More precisely, each player seeks
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to optimize his own goal, which depends on the strategies of the other players upon his own, and
this optimization is performed simultaneously by different players. An equilibrium (in the sense
of Nash) is reached when no player can improve his objective function by changing unilaterally
his strategy. A survey of different modeling and solution concepts of networking games, as well
as a number of different applications in telecommunications and wireless networks, based on
game theory, can be found in [2].
In Cloud computing, game theory methods have been used to provide load balancing and
resource allocation solutions. A number of papers consider centralized and decentralized load
balancing strategies in a system with parallel servers (see [7, 29] and the references therein).
The requests arrive as a Poisson process, and the service time of incoming jobs is assumed to be
known. For such system, the load balancing problem is investigated in two different scenarios:
(i) a centralized setting leading to a global optimization problem, in which a dispatcher decides
where each job will get service so as to minimize the weighted mean number of jobs in the system,
and (ii) a distributed non-cooperative setting leading to a non-cooperative game transformed
into a standard convex optimization problem. The paper studies structural properties of both
strategies, and the efficiency loss in terms of Price of Anarchy (PoA) [30] of the decentralized
scheme relative to the global optimal (centralized) one.
In [41], the authors propose a pricing mechanism for resource allocation in a utility comput-
ing system among competing end-users requests. The fixed available service capacity is allocated
among the different flows proportionally to their monetary bids. The paper studies the resulting
equilibrium point, establishes convergence of a best-response algorithm, and bounds the effi-
ciency loss of this distributed mechanism. More precisely: End-users requests are represented
as job flows in a controlled queueing system. These jobs arrive to the system through a fixed,
random process, are stored in a buffer, and then are serviced by the resource in a first come,
first served manner. The service rate is set through a proportional share mechanism. Within
this framework, the interactions between end-users are modeled as a game. Then, authors show
that the equilibrium can be reached in a distributed, asynchronous manner. The paper also
reports the sensitivity analysis with respect to the variation of problem’s parameters (e.g., load
intensity and relative importance of the competing user requests). Differently from our point of
view, in [41] the problem of the resource allocation is considered for a single virtualized server
among competing user requests, while in this paper we consider the Cloud data center at a
higher granularity (i.e., VMs).
In this paper we take the perspective of SaaS providers which host their applications at a
PaaS provider. Each SaaS provider wants to maximize its profit while complying with QoS
requirements of their end-users, which determine the revenues and the penalties on the basis
of the achieved performance level. The profit of the SaaS is given by the revenues from SLAs
minus the cost sustained for using the resources supplied by the PaaS. The profit maximization
is challenging since on-line services see dynamic workloads that fluctuate over multiple time
scales [17, 22]. Resources have to be allocated flexibly at run-time according to workload fluctu-
ations. Furthermore, each SaaS behaves selfishly and competes with others SaaSs for the use of
resources supplied by the PaaS. The PaaS, in its turn, wants to maximize the revenues obtained
providing the resources. The profits are given by the revenues from the SLA with the SaaSs
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minus the energy costs sustained for running physical servers.
To capture the behavior of SaaSs and PaaS in this conflicting situation, we will model the
run-time service provisioning problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) (see
e.g. [16, 19, 23, 26, 37]), which is an extension of the classical Nash equilibrium problem [35], in
which both the objective function and the feasible region of each player depend on the strategies
chosen by the other players. We then use results from game theory to develop efficient algorithms
for the run-time management and allocation of PaaS resources to competing SaaSs.
In [10, 11], we have considered a problem similar to the one faced here, analysing the service
provisioning problem with on spot resources. With respect to our previous work, in this paper we
extend the game-theoretic model considering a new and more realistic pricing model regulating
SaaS and PaaS contract. Furthermore, we explicitly model energy costs of the PaaS infras-
tructure which requires to include additional decision variables and a totally different solution
approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem under
study. In Section 3, we introduce our model based on the concept of Generalized Nash Equilib-
rium (GNE); moreover, we prove the existence of a potential function for the game and of social
optimum solutions. In Section 4, we prove that the social optimum problem is convex and we
derive some properties of social optima from the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker system. In
Section 5, we provide a solution algorithm based on the best reply dynamics and we prove its
convergence to GNE. The experimental results discussed in Section 6 demonstrate the efficiency
of our algorithm by varing its initial solution. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 7.
2 Problem Description
We consider SaaS providers using Cloud computing facilities according to the PaaS paradigm
to offer multiple transactional Web-Services (WSs), each service representing a different appli-
cation.
The hosted WSs can be heterogeneous with respect to resource demands, workload intensities
and QoS requirements. The set of WS applications offered by SaaS provider s are denoted by
As, while S indicates the set of SaaSs. In the following, we denote by A the set of all WS
applications hosted at the PaaS location, i.e., A
def
= ∪s∈SAs, and we assume As1 ∩ As2 = ∅, for
all s1 6= s2.
Each SaaS provider signs with its customers an SLA contract specifying: (i) the QoS levels
that it must meet while responding to end-user requests for a given application, and (ii) the
corresponding pricing scheme. In particular, we assume SaaSs have to guarantee to their end-
users that the average response time when accessing application k is less than or equal to a given
threshold RSk , while the per-request revenue for the SaaS is αk (see Figure 1).
In turn, each SaaS provider signs an SLA contract with the PaaS: The PaaS must guaran-
tee that the average response time for WS application k is less than or equal to RPk (≤ RSk ).
Furthermore, for the execution of a single request k ∈ As, SaaS s pays a fee βk to the PaaS.
The SaaS per-request revenue αk is greater than or equal to mk βk, where mk > 1 is the SaaS
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margin for the execution of individual requests. Both RPk and βk may vary with the time of the
day. Therefore, the SaaS can ask the PaaS provider to reduce its application response time to
improve the final end-user experience and thus to increase the loyalty of its customers. How-
ever, intuitively, the more stringent are the performance requirements imposed by the SaaS, the
higher is the number of resources devoted by the PaaS to the SaaS and overall the higher is the
per-request fee βk payed by the SaaS. In particular, we assume that the average response times
RPk enters the SaaS payoff function with a linear function, Uk = δs (R
S
k −RPk ). Linear functions
are a flexible mechanism to express the discontent of final end-users as a function of response
times and have been widely used in the literature (see e.g. [12, 15, 38]).
Current Cloud platforms are based on virtualization technology, which allows a flexible
management of the overall intrastructure. Therefore, we assume that applications are executed
in virtual machines (VMs), which are dynamically instantiated by the PaaS provider. We
make the simplifying assumption that each VM hosts a single WS application. Multiple VMs
implementing the same WS application can also run in parallel. We also assume that physical
servers are dedicated to SaaS providers, i.e. every physical server runs the VMs of the same
SaaS. Cloud users usually prefer dedicated servers especially for business critical applications
and/or when security requirements are of paramount importance. The use of dedicated servers
is becoming widespread in the Cloud market [3]. For example, Amazon has devoted specific
data centers to run applications for US government agencies and contractors [5].
For simplicity, we assume that physical servers are homogeneous, having the same processing
capacity C. However, our framework can be extended relaxing this latter assumption. In the
following, NP denotes the total number of physical servers used for the dedicated execution of
WS applications at the PaaS site.
On each physical servers, we assume that SaaS VMs are replicated with a fixed pattern for
fault-tolerance reasons [8] (e.g., for every DBMS instance, two instances of application servers
and three instances of web servers are allocated) and if any additional physical server is needed,
VMs are replicated on the new server according to this fixed allocation pattern. In the following,
we will denote by vsk the proportion of VMs for WS application k hosted by one server dedicated
to SaaS s.
The number of physical servers that the PaaS decides to supply to SaaS provider s is denoted
by Ns. Since the workload of Internet applications can vary by orders of magnitude within the
same business day [17], the physical servers are dynamically allocated by the PaaS provider
periodically, e.g., every hour, according to a short-term workload prediction. One hour is also
the time unit which is usually adopted by PaaS and IaaS to bill the use of resources to their
customers [4]. We denote by Λk the prediction for the arrival rate of WS application k.
In this context, each SaaS provider can make the decision of accepting or rejecting a WS
application execution request to maximize its own revenue. In other terms, SaaS providers can
implement an admission control scheme trading off between the platform costs and the revenues
they gain from their customers [1]. We assume that such decisions are taken according to some
i.i.d. probabilistic law. The resulting application execution rate (or throughput, acceptance
rate) is denoted by Xk ≤ Λk. SaaS providers may possibly incur in penalties pk ≥ 0 upon
rejection of request executions of k. In order to fix the rejection rate above a fixed threshold
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and guarantee a minimum availability, SaaS s may decide to guarantee a minimum throughput
λk.
We assume that each physical server runs a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) configured
in work-conserving mode. The resource allocation mechanism implemented by VMMs can be
modeled as a first approximation by the Generalized Processor Sharing (GPS) [36] scheduling
(see e.g. [20, 39]). Under GPS, the fraction of the available processing capacity of each server
devoted to WS application k at time t is:
φsk∑
l∈K(t)
φsl
, (1)
where φsk denotes the CPU share, or weight, of application k of the SaaS provider s, and
K(t) ⊆ As is the set of WS applications with waiting requests at time t.
To estimate the per-request mean response time achieved with the GPS mechanism, we adopt
the approximation proposed in [8, Formula (18)]. Under the assumption that the requests of a
given application are evenly distributed among the physical servers in a probabilistic manner,
the mean response time for application k can be approximated by
Rk =
Ns
Xk
·
ρs
ρsk
φsk
C
∑
l∈As vsl
ρsl
φsl
− ρs ρskφsk
, (2)
whereXk/Ns is the arrival rate of application-k requests to one physical server of SaaS s (requests
are evenly distributed among the Ns physical servers), µk denotes the maximum service rate of
a capacity-one server for executing a class k request, ρsk
def
= Xk/(µkNs) is interpreted as the
“utilization” of application k requests, and ρs
def
=
∑
l∈As vsl ρsl. Formula 2 renders the mean
response time of a virtual machine when the VMM uses the GPS mechanism described above;
we point the interested reader to [8] for further details.
It is shown in [8, Theorem 5] that the mean response time of all SaaS-s applications, that is∑
k∈As
Xk∑
k′∈As
Xk′
Rk
where Rk is given by (2), is minimized when φsk = ρsk, for all k ∈ As. We assume that PaaSs
make this choice for the CPU shares, which implies that the average WS application k response
time becomes (upon substitution in (2) and noting that
∑
l∈As vsl = 1)
Rk =
Ns
Xk
·
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
. (3)
Such choice of the weights induce a fair load-balancing among the number of on-going WS
execution requests. In fact, (3) implies that the number on-going WS execution requests of
application k, which is RkXk/Ns by Little’s law [32], is independent of k.
Remark 1. In the remainder of the paper, we use (3) as model of the response time of application
k requests on PaaS s. However, part of the results presented below immediately follow by only
using the convexity of Rk. This lets us stipulate that they hold also for a wider class of response
time functions.
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Finally, we denote by c the time unit cost for a physical server when it is turned on, including
its power consumption and cooling overhead [28].
Table 1 summarizes the notation used in this paper for quick reference. Note that, the
SaaS SLA contract parameters (e.g., RSk or pk) are usually public available and stored in public
registries [13]. Requests arrival rates and resource demands (i.e., Λk, µk) can be determined by
SaaS and PaaS by prediction methods or monitoring [6, 9]. Vice versa, platform parameters
(e.g., servers time unit costs c and the overall number of servers available N) are known only
by the PaaS. Hence, the PaaS has or can determine easily the full knowledge of the system
parameters.
System Parameters
S Set of SaaS providers
As Set of applications offered by SaaS s
A = ∪s∈SAs
C Processing capacity of physical servers
αk Revenue for the SaaS provider for single request execution of WS
application k
mk SaaS margin for the execution of individual requests
pk SaaS penalty for application k requests rejection
δs Utility function slope for SaaS provider s
RSk Upper bound on the average response time of WS application k
guaranteed to the SaaS customers
λk Minimum arrival rate guaranteed for WS application k
Λk Prediction (maximum) arrival rate for WS application k
vsk Proportion of VMs running WS application k hosted by a physical
server dedicated to SaaS s
µk Maximum service rate of a capacity 1 server for executing a class
k request
c Time unit cost for a physical server when it is turned on
NP Overall number of physical servers available to the PaaS
PaaS Decision Variables
βk Revenue for the PaaS provider for single request execution of WS
application k
Ns Number of physical servers dedicated to SaaS s
SaaS Decision Variables
Xk Throughput for application k
RPk Upper bound for the average response time of WS application k
Table 1: Parameters and decision variables
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3 Game-theoretic Model
As discussed in Section 1, the goal of the PaaS is to maximize its revenues obtained from the
execution of SaaS applications minus the cost incurred with the use of the physical servers.
On the other hand, the goal of each SaaS provider is to maximize its payoff which considers
the profits obtained from the execution of incoming requests, the costs incurred for the use of
the platform and the penalties associated with request rejections. Each SaaS payoff function
finally includes also a linear term which takes into account, for each application-k request, the
impact of the response time RPk on the end-user loyalties and expresses the discontent of final
end-users experiencing large response times.
As it will be detailed in the following, the behavior of the PaaS and the SaaSs in this
conflicting situation can be modeled as a GNEP. Section 3.1 formulates the PaaS resource
allocation problem, while Section 3.2 formalizes SaaS providers optimization problems. The
Generalized Nash equilibria of the game which is originated with this setting are defined in
Section 3.3 and a potential function for the game is described in Section 3.4.
3.1 Game formulation from the PaaS side
The PaaS optimization problem is:
max
βk,Ns
∑
k∈A
βkXk −
∑
s∈S
cNs (4)
subject to:
βk ≤ αk
mk
, ∀ k ∈ A, (5)∑
s∈S
Ns ≤ NP , (6)
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
≤ RPk Xk, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ k ∈ As, (7)∑
l∈As
vslXl
µl
< C Ns, ∀ s ∈ S. (8)
The first and second terms of the payoff function are the revenues for the execution of end-user
requests and the costs of using physical servers, respectively. Constraint family (5) guarantees
each SaaS with a margin for the execution of end-user requests (mk > 1). Constraint (6)
entails that the total number of servers adopted is lower than the one available. Constraints (7)
guarantee that the average response time for requests execution satisfies the SLA between PaaS
and SaaSs. Finally, constraint family (8) guarantees that physical servers resources are not
saturated.
In the formulation of the PaaS problem, we have not imposed variables Ns to be integer, as in
reality they are. In fact, requiring variables to be integer makes the solution much more difficult.
Therefore, we consider the continuous relaxation of the problem. However, experimental results
have shown that if the optimal values of the variables are fractional and they are rounded to
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the closest integer solution, the gap between the solution of the real integer problem and the
relaxed one is very small. This is a common assumption adopted in the literature [43] and is
also intuitive for large scale data centers including thousands of servers.
We note that the objective function of the PaaS provider is linear and increasing with respect
to variables βk which are bounded above by the constants αk/mk. Hence βk = αk/mk in every
optimal solution of the PaaS provider for any strategy chosen by the SaaS providers. Thus the
PaaS revenue for the execution of end-user requests is equal to
∑
k∈A αkXk/mk, which depends
only on variables Xk chosen by SaaS providers and is independent from PaaS variables Ns,
hence this term can be deleted from the PaaS objective function. In other words, the PaaS
optimization problem consists in minimizing costs of using physical servers. From now on, we
assume that the PaaS optimization problem has the following form:
max
Ns
Θp
def
= −
∑
s∈S
cNs (9)
subject to: ∑
s∈S
Ns ≤ NP , (10)
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
CNs −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
≤ RPk Xk, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ k ∈ As, (11)∑
l∈As
vslXl/µl < C Ns, ∀ s ∈ S. (12)
We note that the problem (9)–(12) is easy to solve because constraints (11)-(12) can be
rearranged to obtain linear constraints with respect to Ns so that each variable Ns can be
optimized separately. Hence the PaaS optimal solution is
Ns = max
k∈As
RPk Xk
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C RPk Xk −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
, ∀ s ∈ S, (13)
provided that the sum of the right-hand sides does not exceed the upper bound NP ; otherwise
there is no feasible solution.
3.2 Game Formulation from the SaaS Side
The SaaS s optimization problem is:
max
Xk,R
P
k
Θs
def
=
∑
k∈As
[
αk
(
1− 1
mk
)
Xk − pk (Λk −Xk) + δs (RSk −RPk )Xk
]
(14)
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subject to:
λk ≤ Xk ≤ Λk, ∀ k ∈ As, (15)
RPk ≤ RSk , ∀ k ∈ As, (16)
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
CNs −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
≤ RPk Xk, ∀ k ∈ As, (17)∑
l∈As
vslXl/µl < CNs. (18)
The first terms of the payoff function compute the net revenues obtained from the execution
of end-users’ request. The second terms determine the penalties incurred with request rejections.
Finally, the last term evaluates the response time RPk for WS application k requests according
to the utility function established in the SLA between the SaaS and each end-user. Constraint
family (15) states that Xk cannot be larger than the actual arrival rate Λk and smaller than the
minimum admission rate λk. Constraint family (16) entails that the response time for application
k negotiated with the PaaS is smaller than RSk . As in the previous section, constraints (17) and
(18) guarantee that the application response time satisfies the SLA and that physical servers
are not saturated, respectively.
3.3 Generalized Nash Equilibria
The model resulting from the optimization problems described in the previous sections is a
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem with joint constraints, where the players are the PaaS
and SaaS providers: The strategies of the PaaS provider are N = (Ns)s∈S, the strategies of
each SaaS provider s are Xs = (Xk)k∈As and RPs = (RPk )k∈As . Each SaaS provider shares
constraints (17) and (18) with the PaaS provider.
In this setting, a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) is a set of strategies such that no
player can improve its payoff function by changing its strategy unilaterally [26], i.e. a GNE is a
vector (X,R
P
, N) such that the following relations hold:
Θp(N) ≥ Θp(N), ∀ N s.t. (X,RP , N) satisfies constraints (10)–(12), (19)
and for all s ∈ S
Θs(Xs, R
P
s ) ≥ Θs(Xs, RPs ), ∀ (Xs, RPs )s.t. (Xs, RPs , N)
satisfies constraints (15)–(18).
(20)
3.4 Potential function
Since (i) the payoff function Θp of PaaS provider depends only on his own strategies Ns, (ii) the
payoff function Θs of each SaaS provider s only depends on his own strategies Xs and R
P
s , and
(iii) constraints (17) and (18) are shared among the players, we can conclude that this game is a
generalized potential game [27, 34] where the potential function is simply the sum of the players
payoff functions. This potential function represents a social welfare for the game.
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Proposition 1. The function
Π(X,RP , N)
def
=
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈As
[
αk
(
1− 1
mk
)
Xk − pk (Λk −Xk) + δs (RSk −RPk )Xk
]
−
∑
s∈S
cNs
(21)
is a potential for the game.
We denote by Ω the feasible region containing the variables of all the players, i.e.
Ω = {(X,RP , N) : (10), (11), (12) hold and (15)-(16) hold for all s ∈ S}.
Since this is a generalized potential game, we can assume that the potential Π is the payoff
function of each player; therefore each global maximizer of Π on the set Ω, called social optimum,
is a special Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). In other words, social optima represent the
GNE which are optimal from a social point of view.
Proposition 2. There exists at least one social optimum.
Proof. First, we prove that Ω is a closed set. For any (X,RP , N) ∈ Ω we have:
C Ns −
∑
l∈As
vslXl
µl
≥
Ns
∑
l∈As
vslXl
µl
RPk Xk
[from (11)]
≥
Ns
∑
l∈As
vslXl
µl
RSk Λk
[from (15)-(16)]
≥
(∑
l∈As
vslXl
µl
)2
C RSk Λk
[from (12)]
≥
(∑
l∈As
vslλl
µl
)2
C RSk Λk
[from (15)]
for all s ∈ S and k ∈ As. Therefore we obtain that
C Ns −
∑
l∈As
vslXl
µl
≥ max
k∈As

(∑
l∈As
vslλl
µl
)2
C RSk Λk
 ∀ s ∈ S, (22)
hence in the definition of Ω we can replace constraints (12) with constraints (22), thus Ω is a
closed set. Since Ω is also bounded and Π is continuous, the existence of social optima follows
from the well-known Weierstrass theorem.
4 The Social Optimum Problem
The Cloud provisioning game is extremely challenging since the number of SaaS providers |S|
and WS applications |A| characterizing problem instances of interest in practice are extremely
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large (i.e., hundreds of SaaS and thousands of applications [17]). In order to identify efficient
solution methods, in this section we analyze the social optimum problem determining its main
properties.
In particular, we will show that constraints (11) hold as equality in any social optimum and
that the social optimum problem is convex. Furthermore, bounds relating the platform capacity,
the energy costs and the penalties incurred in case of requests rejection will be identified for
interesting system regimes.
Proposition 3. If (X,R
P
, N) is a social optimum, then the response time constraints (11) are
all active, i.e.
N s
∑
l∈As vslX l/µl
C N s −
∑
l∈As vslX l/µl
= R
P
k Xk, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ k ∈ As. (23)
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists an index k ∈ As, for some s, such that
N s
∑
l∈As vslX l/µl
C N s −
∑
l∈As vslX l/µl
< R
P
k Xk.
If we slightly decrease the value of R
P
k , keeping fixed the values of the other variables, we obtain a
new feasible vector (X,RP , N) such that Π(X,RP , N) > Π(X,R
P
, N), which is impossible.
It follows from Proposition 3 that the variables RPk can be expressed as function of Xk and
Ns, hence the social optimum problem can be rewritten as follows:
max
X,N
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈As
[
αk
(
1− 1
mk
)
Xk − pk(Λk −Xk) + δsRSkXk
]
−
∑
s∈S
[
cNs + δs|As|
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
CNs −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
] (24)
subject to:
λk ≤ Xk ≤ Λk, ∀ k ∈ A, (25)
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
≤ RSk Xk, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ k ∈ As, (26)∑
s∈S
Ns ≤ NP , (27)∑
l∈As
vslXl/µl < C Ns, ∀ s ∈ S. (28)
Proposition 4. The social optimum problem (24)–(28) is convex.
Proof. We have to prove that the objective function is concave and all the constraints are convex.
To this end, it is sufficient to show that the functions
(Xs, Ns) 7→
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
CNs −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
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are convex when constraints (28) are satisfied. Since all these functions have the same structure,
we can consider only the function
h(x1, . . . , xn, y)
def
=
y
∑n
i=1 aixi
b y −∑ni=1 aixi ,
where variables x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y correspond to Xs and Ns respectively, and the constants
ai > 0 and b > 0 to vsl/µl and C respectively. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the
function h is convex when b y −∑ni=1 aixi > 0 (which corresponds to constraint (28)).
The first derivatives of h are
∂h
∂xj
=
bajy
2
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)2 , j = 1, . . . , n, ∂h∂y = −(
∑n
i=1 aixi)
2
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)2 ;
the second derivatives of h are
∂2h
∂xj ∂x`
=
2 b aj a` y
2
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3 , j, ` = 1, . . . , n,
∂2h
∂xj ∂y
=
−2 b aj y
∑n
i=1 aixi
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3 , j = 1, . . . , n,
∂2h
∂y2
=
2 b (
∑n
i=1 aixi)
2
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3 .
Thus the Hessian matrix of h is
∇2h(x1, . . . , xn, y) = 2 b
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3

a21y
2 · · · a1any2 −a1y
∑n
i=1 aixi
...
. . .
...
...
a1any
2 · · · a2ny2 −any
∑n
i=1 aixi
−a1y
∑n
i=1 aixi . . . −any
∑n
i=1 aixi (
∑n
i=1 aixi)
2
 .
For any vector u = (u1, . . . , un, un+1) ∈ Rn+1 we have
uT ∇2h(x1, . . . , xn, y)u = 2 b
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3 uT

a1 y
2
∑n
i=1 aiui − a1 y un+1
∑n
i=1 aixi
...
an y
2
∑n
i=1 aiui − an y un+1
∑n
i=1 aixi
−y (∑ni=1 aixi) (∑ni=1 aiui) + un+1 (∑ni=1 aixi)2

=
2 b
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3
y2( n∑
i=1
aiui
)2
− 2 y un+1
(
n∑
i=1
aiui
) (
n∑
i=1
aixi
)
+u2n+1
(
n∑
i=1
aixi
)2
=
2 b
(b y −∑ni=1 aixi)3
[
y
n∑
i=1
aiui − un+1
n∑
i=1
aixi
]2
.
Therefore, if b y−∑ni=1 aixi > 0, then the Hessian matrix of h is positive semidefinite and hence
h is convex.
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In the rest of this section we analyze the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system of the social
optimum problem and derive some bounds for the social optima relating the platform capacity,
the energy costs and the penalties incurred in case of requests rejection.
Since the social optimum problem is convex and the Slater constraint qualification holds, the
KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for the optimality. If we denote Lik ≥ 0, for k ∈ A
and i = 1, 2, 3, the KKT multipliers associated to constraints (25) and (26), and L4 ≥ 0, the
multiplier associated to constraint (27), then the KKT system is the following:
αk
(
1− 1
mk
)
+ pk + δsR
S
k
− C vskN
2
s
µk (C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl)
2
δs |As|+ ∑
l∈As
L3l

+L1k − L2k + L3k RSk = 0, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ k ∈ As, (29)
−c+
( ∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
)2 δs |As|+ ∑
l∈As
L3l
− L4 = 0, ∀ s ∈ S, (30)
L1k (Xk − λk) = 0, ∀ k ∈ A, (31)
L2k (Xk − Λk) = 0, ∀ k ∈ A, (32)
L3k
(
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
−RSk Xk
)
= 0, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ k ∈ As, (33)
L4
(∑
s∈S
Ns −NP
)
= 0, (34)
constraints (25)–(28).
In the following we will analyze two limiting regimes for the Cloud system. In particular
Proposition 5 considers that the system provides very good performance for a provider s (i.e., the
constraints (26) are not active for the whole set of WS applications As hosted at the PaaS site),
which corresponds to light load conditions for the SaaS s. Vice versa, Proposition 6 considers
the case a provider s is under heavy load and the minumum workload is served for every WS
applications in As. These results are used in Section 5 to identify the initial solution for our
resource allocation algorithm, and, as it will be further discussed in Section 6, they allow to
achieve the best efficiency in terms of PoA.
In the remainder of the paper, we will denote with Ψsk = αk
(
1− 1mk
)
+ pk + δsR
S
k and we
set Ωsk = vsk C/µk.
Proposition 5. If (X,N) is a social optimum solution and there exists a SaaS provider s such
that Xk = Λk and the response time is strictly lower than R
S
k for all WS applications k ∈ As,
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then: ∑
k∈As
vsk Λk/µk
C −
√
δs|As|
min
k∈As
Ψsk/Ωsk
≤ Ns ≤
√
c+
√
δs|As|
C
√
c
∑
k∈As
vsk Λk/µk. (35)
Proof. Since for all k ∈ As the constraint (26) is not active and Xk = Λk, we obtain L1k = L3k = 0.
It follows from (29) that
Ψsk − Ωsk δs |As|N
2
s
(C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl)
2
= L2k ≥ 0 ∀ k ∈ As,
hence we have
min
k∈As
Ψsk
Ωsk
≥ δs |As|N
2
s
(C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl)
2
.
Setting Xl = Λl and taking into account the equilibrium condition C Ns −
∑
l∈As vsl Λl/µl > 0,
we obtain the first inequality of (35).
On the other hand, it follows from (30) that
δs|As|
( ∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
)2
− c = L4 ≥ 0.
Setting Xl = Λl for all l ∈ As, we get
δs|As|
c
∑
k∈As
vsl Λl/µl
2 ≥
C Ns −∑
l∈As
vsl Λl/µl
2 ,
which, together with the equilibrium condition C Ns −
∑
l∈As vsl Λl/µl > 0, implies the second
inequality of (35).
Proposition 6. If (X,N) is a social optimum solution and there exists a SaaS provider s such
that Xk = λk and the response time is strictly lower than R
S
k for all WS applications k ∈ As,
then
Ns ≤ min

1
C −
√
δs|As|
max
k∈As
Ψsk/Ωsk
,
√
c+
√
δs|As|
C
√
c

∑
k∈As
vsk λk/µk. (36)
Proof. Since for all k ∈ As the constraint (26) is not active and Xk = λk, we obtain L2k = L3k = 0.
From (29) we obtain
Ψsk − Ωsk δs |As|N
2
s
(C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl)
2
= −L1k ≤ 0, ∀ k ∈ As,
hence we have
max
k∈As
Ψsk
Ωsk
≤ δs |As|N
2
s
(C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl)
2
.
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Setting Xl = λl and taking into account the equilibrium condition C Ns −
∑
l∈As vsl λl/µl > 0,
we obtain
Ns ≤
∑
l∈As
vsl λl/µl
C −
√
δs|As|
max
k∈As
Ψsk/Ωsk
. (37)
On the other hand, from (30) we get
δs|As|
( ∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
)2
− c = L4 ≥ 0.
Setting Xl = λl for all l ∈ As, we get
δs|As|
c
∑
k∈As
vsl λl/µl
2 ≥
C Ns −∑
l∈As
vsl λl/µl
2 ,
which, together with the equilibrium condition C Ns −
∑
l∈As vsl λl/µl > 0, implies
Ns ≤
√
c+
√
δs|As|
C
√
c
∑
k∈As
vsk λk/µk. (38)
Finally, the thesis follows from (37) and (38).
5 Distributed Solution Method
In the previous Section it has been proved that the social optimum problem is convex and,
from a theoretical point of view, it could be solved by the PaaS which has the full knowledge
of system parameters (see Section 2). However, computational results demonstrate that only
small instances can be solved to optimality with commercial nonlinear optimization packages
(see Section 6). To handle representative problem sizes, in this Section we provide a solution
algorithm which converges to a GNE. Several different versions of the algorithm we implemented
are characterized by a different choice of the initial solution.
Before describing the solution algorithm, we analyze in more details the PaaS and SaaSs
problems. In Section 3.1 we have shown that PaaS problem is easy to solve. On the other
hand, the SaaS problem (14)–(18) can not be solved analytically, but it can be reformulated as
a convex problem. In fact, we can prove similarly to Proposition 3 that constraints (17) are
active in any SaaS optimal solution. Hence, the variables RPk can be expressed as function of
Xk by formula (23) and we can rewrite the SaaS problem as follows:
max
Xs
∑
k∈As
[
αk
(
1− 1
mk
)
Xk − pk (Λk −Xk) + δsRSk Xk
]
−δs|As|
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
(39)
subject to:
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λk ≤ Xk ≤ Λk, ∀ k ∈ As, (40)
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
C Ns −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
≤ RSk Xk, ∀ k ∈ As, (41)∑
l∈As
vslXl/µl < CNs. (42)
Finally, it can be proved that this problem is convex following the proof of Proposition 4.
Now, we describe the solution algorithm and prove that it converges to a GNE.
Solution Algorithm
1. An initial value for the number of physical servers of each SaaS Ns is identified.
2. If
∑
s∈SNs > N
P , the PaaS provider reducesNs proportionally to constraint (10) violation,
i.e. the PaaS sets
N s =
NsN
P∑
s′∈S
Ns′
, ∀ s ∈ S; (43)
otherwise PaaS provider set N s = Ns for all s ∈ S.
3. Given N , each SaaS provider s finds a optimal solution (Xk)k∈As , of the convex optimiza-
tion problem (39)–(42) and set
R
P
k =
1
Xk
N s
∑
l∈As vslX l/µl
C N s −
∑
l∈As vslX l/µl
, ∀ k ∈ As.
The algorithm performs three simple steps. An initial estimate for the number of physical
servers is identified. If the initial server assignment is unfeasible, then the PaaS reallocates
servers among SaaSs. Finally, each SaaS computes the optimal values for (Xs, R
P
s ) accordingly
to its objective. We can obtain many different versions of the algorithm according to the way
and the players (SaaS or PaaS) that select the initial number of servers. We first prove that the
solution algorithm converges to a GNE, then we formulate five alternative methods that will be
evaluated in the next Section.
Proposition 7. If N is such that the feasible region (40)–(42) of each SaaS provider is non-
empty, then the vector (X,R
P
, N) found by the solution algorithm is a GNE.
Proof. Since each SaaS determines the best reply (Xs, R
P
s ) to the PaaS strategy N , we obtain
that all the constraints (17) are active. Thus, by formula (13) also the strategy N of the PaaS
is the best reply to the strategies (X,R
P
) of the SaaS players. Hence (X,R
P
, N) is a GNE
because of relations (19)–(20).
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According to the previous result, the solution algorithm finds a GNE. However, the equi-
librium is found in a single best reply dynamic iteration and depends on the arbitrary choice
N at step 1. Hence, finding good equilibria for the problem under study could be hard. We
have implemented the following heuristic methods for defining a vector N which provides a good
equilibrium.
• Method 1: Each SaaS randomly selects Ns at step 1. Random initialization at step 1 is
considered as a benchmark for the comparison of alternative methods.
• Method 2: At step 1, each SaaS sets Xk randomly in the interval [λk,Λk] and determines
Ns such that physical servers average utilization is
∑
l∈As
vslXl
C Ns µl
= 0.6. In other words,
the initial number of physical servers is determined according to the utilization thresholds
principle which is an heuristic for Cloud systems resource allocation widely used in the
literature [21, 40, 44] and adopted in practice by IaaS/PaaS providers [4].
• Method 3: At step 1, each SaaS s maximizes the function
∑
k∈As
[
αk
(
1− 1
mk
)
Xk − pk(Λk −Xk) + δsRSkXk
]
− cNs − δs|As|
Ns
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
CNs −
∑
l∈As vslXl/µl
subject to constraints (40)–(42), considering both Xs and Ns as decision variables.
• Method 4: At step 1, the PaaS sets
Ns =
√
c+
√
δs|As|
C
√
c
∑
k∈As
vsk Λk/µk,
according to Proposition 5.
• Method 5: At step 1, the PaaS sets
Ns = min

1
C −
√
δs|As|
max
k∈As
Ψsk/Ωsk
,
√
c+
√
δs|As|
C
√
c

∑
k∈As
vsk λk/µk,
according to Proposition 6.
Note that the initialization steps implemented by methods 4 and 5 are performed by the PaaS
provider, since they require the knowledge of the time unit cost c of use of the physical servers,
which is usually unknown by the SaaS providers. Method 3 can be implemented in practice only
if the PaaS shares c with SaaSs. Methods 1–5 are suitable for a distributed implementation and
require at most three messages exchange between each SaaS and PaaS (for providing the initial
service demand, to communicate the effective number of physical servers, and finally set up the
WS applications response time threshold and overall throughput).
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6 Numerical Results
The solution algorithm proposed has been evaluated for a variety of system and workload config-
urations. Section 6.1 is devoted to quantitatively analyze the efficiency of the equilibria achieved
by our approach, while the scalability is discussed in Section 6.2. Finally, Section 6.3 illustrates
the equilibria properties for a medium size system by varying application performance parame-
ters.
6.1 Equilibria Efficiency
To evaluate the efficiency of our algorithm we have considered a very large set of randomly
generated instances. The number of SaaS providers has been varied between 100 and 1,000, the
number of applications (evenly shared among SaaSs) between 1,000 and 10,0001.
The performance parameters of the applications and infrastructural resources costs have been
randomly generated uniformly in the ranges reported in Table 2 as in [8, 12, 31], considering also
real applications [11], according to commercial fees applied by IaaS/PaaS Cloud providers [4, 33]
and the energy costs available in the literature [28]. We have included in the time unit cost c
of a physical server also the overhead of the cooling system according to the values reported
in [28], varying also the cost of energy per kWh. Furthermore, the penalty values pk have been
set proportional to the revenues for single request execution αk, pk = γ
1
kαk, where γ
1
k has been
randomly generated uniformly in the range [5, 50], as in [42], while the upper bounds on the
average response time thresholds guaranteed to the SaaS customers were set proportional to
the request service demand 1/µk, i.e., R
S
k = γ
2
k/µk, where γ
2
k has been randomly generated
uniformly in the range [100, 200], as in [13]. Finally, since request rejection has an important
impact on SaaS provider reputation, we set λk = 0.95Λk.
αk [0.01, 1] $/req c [0.03, 0.14] $/hour δs [0.1, 1]
µk [10, 1000] req/s Λk [100, 1000] req/s
mk [1, 2] vsk [1, 100]
Table 2: Performance parameters and time unit cost ranges.
We denote with x˜ any social optimum and with x the GNE found by the solution algorithm
using methods 1–5. The efficiency has been measured in terms of the Price of Anarchy (PoA)
evaluated as
PoA =
Π(x)
Π(x˜)
.
The PoA is a measure of the inefficiency due to PaaS and SaaSs selfish behavior with respect to
the scenario where the social optimum is pursued. The metric is lower or equal to 1 (the greater
the better).
1We have verified that the performance of our solution is not affected by the applications to SaaSs assignment
cardinality (we varied the number of applications per SaaS in the range 1-100), both in terms of Price of Anarchy
and execution time. Results are omitted for space limitation.
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Random instances have been generated guaranteeing that the constraint (27) is active, which
corresponds to the worst case situation for a Cloud system (heavy workload) and for the proposed
methods which otherwise can determine the social optimum naively (e.g., if the servers are not
saturated, PoA is always equal to 1 for method 3). This has been obtained by solving the social
optimum problem with an infinite number of servers and then by setting NP equal to ρ times
the total number of servers actually used. In order to evaluate the robustness of our solution, ρ
has been set equal to 0.9, 0.8 and 0.7, which corresponds to increasing workload conditions for
the PaaS.
Results are reported in Tables 3–5. The figures reported in each table are the means com-
puted on 10 different runs.
(|S|,|A|) Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5
(100,1000) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.50
(200,2000) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.45 0.49
(300,3000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.51
(400,4000) 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.48 0.53
(500,5000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.54
(600,6000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.50
(700,7000) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.50
(800,8000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.52
(900,9000) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.50
(1000,10000) 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.49
Average 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.51
Table 3: Solution methods efficiency, ρ = 0.9.
(|S|,|A|) Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5
(100,1000) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.50
(200,2000) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.45 0.48
(300,3000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.51
(400,4000) 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.48 0.54
(500,5000) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.56
(600,6000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.51
(700,7000) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.53
(800,8000) 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.52
(900,9000) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.50
(1000,10000) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.51
Average 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.52
Table 4: Solution methods efficiency, ρ = 0.8.
For every method the PoA does not depend significantly on the system size, neither on the
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(|S|,|A|) Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5
(100,1000) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.50
(200,2000) 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.45 0.48
(300,3000) 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.51
(400,4000) 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.50 0.54
(500,5000) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.51 0.57
(600,6000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.51
(700,7000) 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.50
(800,8000) 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.56
(900,9000) 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.50
(1000,10000) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.49
Average 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.51
Table 5: Solution methods efficiency, ρ = 0.7.
system workload conditions. Furthermore, methods 1–3 perform similarly, the PoA is around
0.4 (i.e., on average the percentage difference of the sum of the payoff functions with respect
to the social optimum is lower than 60%). This means that the heuristic solution based on the
utilization threshold proposed in the literature (implemented by method 2) achieves the same
results of random initialization (implemented by method 1). Vice versa, methods 4 and 5, based
on the analysis of the KKT system of the social optimum problem, allow to improve the PoA
by 15% and 25%, respectively.
6.2 Algorithms Scalability
The scalability of our approach has been evaluated performing tests on a VMWare virtual ma-
chine based on Ubuntu 11.04 server, running on an Intel Nehalem dual socket quad-core system
with 32 GB of RAM. The virtual machine has a physical core dedicated with guaranteed per-
formance and 4 GB of memory reserved. KNITRO 8.0 has been used as nonlinear optimization
solver, which can exploit the multi-core architecture of our system. We have considered a very
large set of randomly generated instances obtained as in the previous Section varying the model
parameters according to the ranges reported in Table 2.
Table 6 reports the average execution time required by our methods for problem instances
of different sizes. As in the previous Section, the average values reported in the table have
always been computed by considering 10 instances with the same size. Results show that the
proposed methods are very efficient and can solve problem instances of maximum size in less
than one minute. Usually in Cloud systems resource allocation is performed periodically on a
hourly basis [1, 14, 17]. Hence, a social optimum solution can be computed directly by the PaaS
only for problem instances including 700 SaaSs and 7,000 WS applications which are not very
significant in practice.
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(|S|,|A|) Social Opt. Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5
Solution
(100,1000) 132.80 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.60 0.80
(200,2000) 364.70 3.35 3.30 4.30 3.10 3.30
(300,3000) 632.50 3.31 3.31 5.31 6.31 7.31
(400,4000) 972.90 5.01 5.10 5.20 3.90 4.10
(500,5000) 1551.50 6.53 6.90 7.10 7.80 7.80
(600,6000) 1940,00 7.93 8.32 8.51 9.42 10.18
(700,7000) 2452.10 9.32 9.92 10.42 11.87 12.33
(800,8000) 3224.40 11.44 11.28 11.27 10.07 9.36
(900,9000) 3860.70 14.21 13.60 12.65 11.50 11.11
(1000,10000) 6100.00 41.60 36.60 43.60 44.60 37.60
Table 6: Execution times (s).
6.3 Equilibria Sharing Analysis
The aim of this Section is to analyze how the equilibrium changes by varying the game param-
eters. The results have been obtained by Method 5 only, since the methods proposed do not
differ significantly in terms of execution time and Method 5 performs better in terms of PoA.
In particular, we considered three SaaSs offering five heterogeneous applications each. If not
differently stated we set αk = 0.5 $/req, µk = 10k req/s, mk = 1.5, c = 0.09 $/h, Λk = 450 req/s,
and δs = 0.45 (i.e., we considered the midpoint of the random intervals reported in Table 2).
For the sake of simplicity, we considered the following application to SaaS provider assignment
A1 = {1, . . . , 5}, A2 = {6, . . . , 10}, A3 = {11, . . . , 15}.
In the following we will vary one parameter at the time for the first application k = 1, while
the parameters of the remaining ones will be held fixed. We will investigate how the parameter
change will affect: (i) the throughput ratio of WS application 1, i.e., X1/Λ1, (ii) the throughput
of the remaining applications for the first provider (i.e.,
∑5
k=2Xk) and the total throughput of
the remaining providers (i.e.,
∑15
k=6Xk), (iii) the number of servers of the first SaaS provider
N1, and (iv) WS application 1 average response time R1.
Figures 2–5 show the results we achieved by varying Λ1 in [495, 1165] req/s: As Λ1 increases,
the number of servers used by the SaaS provider 1 increases also linearly (Figure 4), while R1
decreases non-linearly improving by around 57% (Figure 5). Vice versa, X1/Λ1 ratio is not
affected significantly and stays close to 1 (Figure 2), as the overall throughput of the remaining
applications (Figure 3).
Figures 6–9 analyze how the GNE changes by varying application 1 maximum service rate
µ1 (the range [60, 510] req/s has been considered). If the maximum service rate increases,
the service time required to process each WS application 1 request decreases and the overall
capacity required to process WS application 1 decreases accordingly (Figures 8 and 9). Vice
versa, application throughput is not affected (see Figures 6 and 7).
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Figure 2: X1/Λ1 ratio with varying applica-
tion 1 incoming workload.
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Figure 3: Application 2–5 and 6–15 through-
put with varying application 1 incoming work-
load.
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Figure 4: SaaS provider 1 number of servers
with varying application 1 incoming workload.
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Figure 5: WS application 1 average response
time with varying application 1 incoming
workload.
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Figure 6: X1/Λ1 ratio with varying applica-
tion 1 maximum service rate.
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Figure 7: Application 2–5 and 6–15 through-
put with varying application 1 maximum ser-
vice rate.
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Figure 8: SaaS provider 1 number of servers
with varying application 1 maximum service
rate.
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Surprisingly, varying the revenue for application 1 single request execution (α1 varied in
[0.17, 1.02] $/req) has no impact on the metrics under analysis, see Figures 10–13 (however,
recall that WS application rejection penalty p1 is proportional to α1).
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Figure 10: X1/Λ1 ratio with varying applica-
tion 1 per request revenue.
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Figure 11: Application 2–5 and 6–15 through-
put with varying application 1 per request rev-
enue.
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Figure 12: SaaS provider 1 number of servers
with varying application 1 per request rev-
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Figure 13: WS application 1 average response
time with varying application 1 per request
revenue.
Finally, we varied SaaS provider 1 utility function slope δ1 in the range [0.2, 1]. As δ1
increases, the metrics under analysis remain almost constant but change abruptly when δ1 = 0.82
(see Figures 14–17). For that value, the ratio X1/Λ1 drops suddenly from 100% to 95% (the
minimum achievable value), which is very unintuitive.
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Figure 14: X1/Λ1 ratio with varying applica-
tion 1 per request revenue.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 11500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
Sy
st
em
 T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t (
re
q/
s)
δ1 ($/req)
 
 
  Applications 2−5
  Applications 6−15
Figure 15: Application 2–5 and 6–15 through-
put with varying application 1 per request rev-
enue.
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Figure 16: SaaS provider 1 number of servers
with varying application 1 per request rev-
enue.
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7 Conclusions
We proposed a game-theoretic approach for the run-time management of a PaaS provider ca-
pacity among multiple competing SaaSs. The cost model consists of a class of utility functions
which include revenues and penalties incurred depending on the achieved performance level and
the energy costs associated with PaaS resources.
The solution methods proposed have been evaluated for a variety of system and workload
configurations and have been demonstrated effective even for very large size problem instances.
Systems up to thousands of applications can be managed very efficiently.
Results have shown that solution methods proposed by the literature and the one based
on random initialization perform similarly from the PoA point of view. Vice versa, methods 4
and 5 which have been obtained through the analytical analysis of the social optimum problem,
allow to improve PoA by 15–25%. Future work will extend the proposed solutions to consider
multiple time-scales for performing resource allocation ranging from few minutes to one hour.
Finally, the opportunity to allocate SaaS applications on multiple PaaS providers will be also
investigated.
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